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Abstract: In the context of Article 36.1 (b) of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR’63) 
interpretation by the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, this 
paper helps to clarify how European Law developments reinforce a renewed understanding of Article 36 VCCR 
’63 as regards its interaction with Human Rights Law. How could a developing case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights linking individual consular rights with several different rights guaranteed by the 
European Convention on Human Rights—along with the European Union’s quasi-constitutional normative 
approach, including consular rights within citizenship rights and due process common guarantees—condition 
the strongly State-centred interpretation of Article 36 VCCR ’63 by the International Court of Justice? The 
need for a reflection on an interpretative framework for a possible evolutionary, practice-based and teleological 
approach is highlighted by the ICJ’s decision on the Jadhav case (India v. Pakistan).
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Resumo: No contexto da interpretação do Artigo 36.1 (b) da Convenção de Viena sobre Relações Consulares 
(VCCR’63) de 1963 pela Corte Internacional de Justiça e pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos, este 
artigo ajuda a esclarecer como os desenvolvimentos do Direito Europeu reforçam a entendimento renovado 
do Artigo 36 VCCR ‘63 no que diz respeito à sua interação com o direito internacional dos direitos humanos. 
Como poderia uma jurisprudência em desenvolvimento do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos do Humanos ligando 
os direitos consulares individuais a vários direitos diferentes garantidos pela Convenção Europeia dos Direitos 
Humanos - juntamente com a abordagem normativa quase constitucional da União Europeia, incluindo 
direitos consulares dentro dos direitos de cidadania e devido processo legal garantias comuns - condicionam a 
interpretação fortemente centrada no Estado do Artigo 36 VCCR ‘63 pela Corte Internacional de Justiça? O 
artigo objetiva enfatizar a necessidade de uma reflexão sobre um parâmetro para uma possível interpretação 
evolutiva, baseado numa abordagem prática e teleológica da decisão da Corte Internacional de Justiça no caso 
Jadhav (Índia v. Paquistão).
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Nothing great is created suddenly, any more than a bunch of grapes or a fig.
If you tell me that you desire a fig, I answer you that there must be time.
Let it first blossom, then bear fruit, then ripen. 
Epictetus (55–135 AD)
Introduction: a blooming interest in article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on consular 
relations
Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR ’63) concerns 
the right of consular authorities to communicate and contact with nationals of the sending State 
when in the receiving State. As such, it governs the international rights and obligations of both 
the sending and the receiving States. At the same time, this Article spells out individual rights for 
nationals abroad and, more specifically in paragraph 1 (b), specific rights in case of arrest, prison or 
custody.3
Although the consular institution is one of the oldest that can be retraced in the 
intercourse among nations, public service to nationals abroad (including the norms governing 
assistance to detainees) has been mostly ruled by treaties, and particularly by bilateral agreements 
(Heyking, 1930, p. 816; Stuart, 1934, p. 498) rather than customary law, as was evinced in 
1931 in the Affaire Chevreau (France v. United Kingdom).4 Efforts to codify this area have been 
first attempted by scholars5 and private societies,6 and later at public level7 and finally by the 
3 Article 36 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963, 596 UNTS 261.
4 France pleaded the foreign national’s right to consular assistance in the following terms: ‘[D’]aprés le droit international 
commun, il y a une obligation de donner à la personne poursuivie, si elle le demande, l’occasion de communiquer avec son Consul, et 
qu’il y a aussi une obligation internationale de donner des informations aux autorités nationales de la personne poursuivie, si elles les 
demandent’. The arbitrator—the Norwegian FVN Beichmann—concluded that there was no such a thing as a rule of law: 
‘[L’]Arbitre n’estime pas qu’elle presente le caractère d’une règle de droit’, ‘Affaire Chevreau (France contre Royaume-Uni)’ (9 
June 1931) 2 Recueil des Sentences Arbitrales 1123–1124.
5 There are several compilations by well-known nineteenth-century scholars. See, for instance, Bluntschli (1881) in which 
he dedicates Articles 244–275 to consular rules; Field (1876) at 58–77, where Articles 159–185 are devoted to consular 
norms; Fiore (1890), specifically Articles 475–529.
6 The Institut de Droit International in the sessions in Lausanne (1888), Hamburg (1891), Geneva (1892) and Venice (1896) 
with Engelhardt as special rapporteur: (1888–1889) 10 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 272; (1891–1892) 11 
Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 348; (1892–1894) 12 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 275; (1896) 
15 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 272. In 1926, the topic was again addressed and it was concluded that 
no relevant transformations had occurred, see (1927) 33 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 417. The American 
Institute of International Law addressed the topic in 1925, adopting a draft of eleven Articles (Project No. 23) sent to 
the American States through the Pan American Union. See ‘American Institute of International Law: Texts of Projects. 
Project No. 23 “Consuls”’, in ‘Collaboration of the American Institute of International Law with the Pan American Union’, 
supplement, (October 1926) 20 American Journal of International Law 300 pp. 356–357, https://doi.org/10.2307/2212868. 
The International Law Association analysed it in 1926 and 1928, with reports from Strupp and Wehr: Report of the Thirty-
Fourth Conference (Vienna 1926) (1927) p. 433; Report of the Thirty-Fifth Conference, Warsaw (Warsaw 1928) (1929) pp. 
356-375. Finally, the Harvard Law School also studied the Consular Relations regime: Wright prepared a 34-Articles draft 
project, ‘The Legal Position and Functions of Consuls’ (1932). 
7 See ‘Convention relative aux agents consulaires’ in CLV (1934–35) Société de Nations, Recueil des Traités 289. At a 
universal level, it was in 1926 when the topic was included in the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification 
of International agenda as one of the seven topics ripe for codification, although no convention would be prepared in the 
end.
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International Law Commission (ILC).8 Its draft convention was crucial to the adoption of the 
VCCR ’63.9
Nevertheless, Article 36 was not an easy rule to settle during the negotiating conference 
in 1963. Its adoption underlines the progressive development character of this convention in certain 
aspects (Ahmad, 1973, p. 60; Lee, 1966, p. 218, 1969, p. 41; Maresca, 1965, pp. 323-325, 1971, pp. 
122-123, 1974, p. 49; Torres Bernárdez, 1963, p. 78; Venneman, 1965, p. 148; Vilariño Pintos, 2016, 
p. 122; Žourek, 1962, pp. 357, 368, 386-387). For some scholars, it represented the most difficult 
Article to agree on in the conference (Lee, 1966, p. 107; Torres Bernárdez, 1963, p. 99). Its basic 
dimension—the right of consular authorities to communicate with their nationals abroad—went 
undisputed during the 1963 intergovernmental conference, but the role of individual will in 
accepting or rejecting consular assistance and the nature of the information regarding this right 
under the convention both remained unclear.
The text we read today is the result of complex deliberations, and it was agreed on the last 
day of the conference after several proposals and different versions were rejected. Its final wording 
includes: a) the right of the sending State to communicate with its national while in detention 
abroad and b) the rights of the national to be informed of his consular rights, get consul authorities 
informed of his detention and communicate with the sending State consular authorities. It was 
the outcome of a transaction between the intent to return to the original ILC proposal, consisting 
in a compulsory and immediate communication of the detention to the sending State,10 the option 
of compulsory communication unless otherwise expressed by the detainee’s opposition11 and a 
third approach, subjecting that communication to the will of the detainee.12 The United Kingdom’s 
vote for the last option was made conditional to the introduction of an obligation to inform the 
individual of his consular rights;13 Article 36 was then approved (Petit de Gabriel, 2017b, pp. 10-12). 
At present, the State’s right to communicate and assist is dependent on the individual’s 
previous right to be informed of consular rights and the individual’s acceptance of the communication 
8 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1957, v. I (1957) p. 81 (Doc. A/CN 4/108); Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 1960, v. II (1960) p. 2 (Doc A/CN 4/131); Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1961, v. II 
(1961) pp. 57, 134 (Doc A/CN 4/137). The General Assembly—Res 1685 (XVI)—convened an international conference in 
Vienna, beginning in March 1963 and ending on 22 April 1963. On 24 April, the VCCR ’63 was adopted by unanimity.
9 See also Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Doc Of A/Conf 25/16, Add 1, vol II, pp. 179-192.
10 This was proposed by Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Doc A/CONF 25/L 40, Official Records 
of the United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, v. II.
11 This was the position of Algeria, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic de Korea, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Upper Volta, Doc A/CONF 25/L 41 
y Add 1, Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, v. II.
12 This was supported by Canada, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Ecuador, Malaysia, Guinea, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Liberia, Mali, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic de Korea, Sierra Leone, Syria, Thailand, United Arab 
Republic and Venezuela, Doc A/CONF 25/L 49, Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, 
v. II.
13 Doc A/CONF 25/L 50, Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, v. II. Discussions during 
the final day, prior to vote, in Doc A/CONF 25/SR 20, twentieth meeting of the Plenary, Official Records of the United 
Nations Conference on Consular Relations, v. I, pp. 81-87.
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of arrest to the consul and the assistance provided thereafter, unless, of course, a special rule applies 
(such as bilateral agreements that provide for compulsory notification of the arrest or detention, 
as is highlighted by the United States’ regulations on the matter).14 But neither the State’s right to 
communicate nor the detainee’s rights to receive assistance create per se an obligation for the State 
to assist. The emergence of such an obligation by the sending State has been scarcely studied.15
This provision has become relevant since 1999 by virtue of an advisory opinion of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) (Aceves, 2000, p. 555), lately confirmed in its 
contentious case law, and a series of cases decided upon by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
since 1998 (Breard, 1998,16 LaGrand, 2001,17 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004, hereinafter 
Avena,18 and Jadhav, 201919) concerning the United States and Pakistan’s international responsibility 
for violation of the VCCR ’63. Up to Jadhav, these cases generated very interesting scholarly 
contributions to several points of law, such as the compulsory nature of provisional measures orders, 
the guarantees of non-repetition for similar and recurrent violations, the effects of ICJ decisions and 
their application by domestic courts, among others. But since “LaGrand”, the relationship between 
an individual’s right to information on consular rights and consular communication and assistance 
rights, as determined by Article 36.1 (b) VCCR ’63 and human rights law, respectively, constitutes 
a new field for research.20
The consideration of consular rights as more than ordinary rights, as rights connected to 
international human rights law, has already been raised on previous occasions: in 1985 the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who 
Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live, albeit without referring specifically to the 
14 See Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28, Chapter I, Part 50, Section 50.5, Notification of Consular Officers upon the 
arrest of foreign nationals, available from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/28/50.5.https://www.law.cornell.edu/
cfr/text/28/50.5
15 The IACHR advanced the issue in OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the 
Guarantees of the due Process of Law, IACtHR Series A 16 (1999) at paras 126–127, but it eventually did not address the 
question in substance. For an analysis of such an obligation in the context of abolitionism, see Mallory (2016, p. 51).
16 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America) ICJ Reports 1998. Proceedings were 
instituted on 3 April 1998. Paraguay discontinued the proceedings on 2 November 1998, after Mr Breard’s execution. The 
United States concurred, and the Court removed this case from its list on 10 November 1998.
17 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America) ICJ Reports 2001. Germany instituted proceedings on 2 March 1999, and 
the Court ruled on 27 June 2001.
18 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) ICJ Reports 2004. Mexico instituted proceedings 
on 9 January 2003, and the Court ruled on 31 March 2004. In 2015, Mexico filed an application for interpretation concerning 
implementation of the 2004 ICJ decision and a new request for provisional measures on behalf of certain nationals with 
death penalty dates already fixed. A new order demanding a stay of execution was delivered by the ICC. See Request for 
Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. 
United States of America), Provisional measures, ICC, Order of 16 July 2008 (ICJ, 2003).
19 Jadhav (India v. Pakistan), ICJ Reports 2019. India instituted proceedings on 8 May 2017; the Court ordered provisional 
measures on 18 May 2017 (Order, ICJ Reports 2017) and delivered its judgment on 17 July 2019 (ICJ, 2017). The very first 
comments on the application and the demand on provisional measures are already published (Dubey, 2017; Pratap, 2017; 
Wasilewski & Żenkiewicz, 2017).
20 In Jadhav pleadings, India’s memorial, submitted on 13 September 2017, mentions the term ‘human rights’ in at least 92 
occasions. Pakistan’s counter-memorial, submitted on 17 December 2017, includes the expression ‘human rights’ in 12 
occasions. India’s reply, dated 17 April 2018, includes 11 mentions of this very term; and Pakistan’s rejoinder, submitted 
on 17 July 2018, none. Public hearings on the merits were held from 18 to 21 February 2019.
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cases of arrest or detention.21 In 1988, the UNGA adopted the Body of Principles for the Protection 
of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, where Principle 16 includes, along 
with the right to contact a relative, the right to be informed on consular rights (communication 
with and assistance from consular agents).22 Although those texts were to be considered soft law, 
soon after, in 1990, the UNGA adopted a hard law instrument, the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW, in force 
since 1 July 2003),23 whose Article 16, para 7, reproduces the rights contained in Article 36.1 (b) 
VCCR ’63. This convention, however, is of limited effectiveness, as its current 53 Parties are all 
countries of migrant origin, not destination. 
Moreover, in 2008, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Jorge 
Bustamante, whose mandate extends to all countries whether they are a party to the 1990 Convention 
or not, devoted part of his annual report to the “key challenges with regard to the criminalization 
of irregular migration”. Analysing “detention and expulsion” situations in his report, he stated that 
“in certain cases irregular migrants have been denied the right to communication”, which qualifies 
for “ill treatment” along with physical or sexual assault, contrary to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the CMW and the VCCR ’63. Among his final recommendations, 
he proposed that States should “fully and without prejudice investigate cases on an individual basis, 
provid[ing] due process guarantees and consular assistance.”24
Over the last few years, the Human Rights Council (HRC) has revisited two previous 
general comments and has included a reference to individual consular rights in relation to specific 
ICCPR Articles. In particular, in 2014, General Comment 35 (GC 35) on the right to liberty and 
security of persons (Article 9 ICCPR) was adopted, replacing GC 8 (1982) and including a reference 
to the right to communicate with consular authorities as a common safeguard to this right and for 
the prohibition of torture.25 The 2018 GC 36 on Article 6 ICCPR, the right to life (replacing GC 6 
and 14), describes the failure to “promptly inform detained foreign nationals charged with a capital 
crime of their right to consular notification” as a serious procedural flaw, although not explicitly 
covered by Article 14 ICCPR, citing also the common safeguards described in GC 35 concerning the 
right to liberty and security.26
21 Res 40/144, 13 December 1985, A/RES/40/144, Article 10, passed without a vote.
22 Res 43/173, 9 December 1988, A/RES/43/173. 
23 Res 45/158, 18 December 1990, A/45/158, passed without a vote.
24 Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Report on Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including Right to Development, 25 February 2008, A/HRC/7/12, para 44, 
n 34, and para 71.
25 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 35: Article 9 (Liberty and security of person), 16 December 2014, 
CCPR/C/GC/35, at para 58. Reference is made to the 1988 UNGA Body of Principles but not to the VCCR ’63.
26 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, on the Right to Life, 30 October 2018, CCPR/C/GC/36, at para 42 referring explicitly to Article 36 VCCR ’63 and 
citing IACtHR OC-16/99 at n 197; and ibid. at para 57, n 238 referring to GC 35, para 58.
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The 1999 IACHR advisory opinion made reference to the soft law UNGA instruments 
(although not to the CMW) and elaborated on the idea of individual consular rights as a fundamental 
guarantee in the context of death penalty cases (IACtHR, 1999). The ICJ has taken a different 
approach, yet in practice its position was not that far away from the topic. Alongside the universal 
level, the European context has produced several moves that strengthen the connection between 
consular and human rights law. A developing case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has established a link between individual consular rights and several different rights 
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Also, the European Union 
has undertaken a quasi-constitutional normative approach by including consular rights within 
citizenship rights and due process common guarantees, two initiatives that seek to develop the 
Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU).
Whether all this has conditioned the strongly State-centred ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 
VCCR ’63 when deciding upon Jadhav is uncertain. However, this topic highlights more transversal 
issues, such as the potential risk of fragmentation of international law and the confrontation between 
different understandings of the same rules; namely, universal (as expressed in ICJ case law) versus 
regional (as shown in IACHR and ECtHR case law) and general (consular law) versus specialised 
(human rights law, European law). Another aspect worth mentioning is that this topic underscores 
the interaction between the so-called classical international law governing the intercourse among 
nations and a more contemporary approach to a “humanised” international law establishing legal 
limits for State sovereignty over individuals—and their rights and freedoms—under its jurisdiction. 
The European contribution should help to bridge these seemingly opposed perceptions, offering fertile 
ground for systemic integration of international law. This could be compatible with the ICJ’s decision 
on Jadhav if we are to retain the original object and purpose of consular law in relation to the alleged 
violation of Article 14 ICCPR and due process rights in the case.
1 The end of fallow: old rules applied to a new context
As traditional as consular law may seem, the dawn of the twenty-first century has provided 
new opportunities for its progressive development. First, a relation between individual consular 
rights and fair process guarantees has been highlighted as regards death penalty cases. Along with 
it, a new approach to the right to liberty and security, and the guarantees for lawful detention, 
has been tested. And second, a broader spectrum of cases has been opened, no longer related to the 
death penalty, which highlight the connection with other rights such as the prohibition of torture 
or the right to family life. These factors may lead to a reinterpretation of the interdependence of 
conventional and fundamental rights.
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1.1 Sowing the seeds: the Inter-American court of human rights and the international 
court of juzstice momentum
The IACtHR’s Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 was the first opportunity for an international 
tribunal—and a human rights tribunal as well—to address the issue of minimum judicial guarantees 
and the requirement of the due process “when a court sentences to death foreign nationals whom 
the host State has not informed of their right to communicate with and seek assistance from 
the consular authorities of the State of which they are nationals.”27 On 9 December 1997, “after 
the bilateral representations that the Government of Mexico had made on behalf of some of its 
nationals, whom the host State [the United States] had allegedly not informed of their right to 
communicate with Mexican consular authorities and who had been sentenced to death in ten states 
in the United States”, Mexico sought an advisory opinion from the IACtHR on Article 36 VCCR 
’63 in relation to due process guarantees. This same context would later lead Mexico to submit an 
application to the ICJ, claiming the international responsibility of the United States for violating 
the VCCR ’63 (Avena case). Mexico was seeking the IACtHR to assert that Article 36 of the VCCR 
’63 contained provisions concerning the protection of human rights, “applied and interpreted in the 
light of the expression ‘all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial’”, as determined in Article 14 of 
the ICCPR. It further enquired about “the juridical consequences of the imposition and application 
of the death penalty in the light of failure to give the notification referred to in Article 36(1)(b) of 
the Vienna Convention”28 with respect to the VCCR ’63, the ICCPR, the Organization of American 
States Charter and the American Declaration. 
For the IACtHR, Article 36 VCCR’63 unanimously confers rights upon detained foreign 
nationals, among them the right to information on consular assistance, with said rights carrying 
with them “correlative obligations for the host State”; it “concerns the protection of the rights of a 
national of the sending State and is part of the body of international human rights law.” The Court 
further stated that “the individual’s right to information established in Article 36(1)(b) allows the 
right to the due process of law recognised in Article 14 of the ICCPR to have practical effects in 
concrete cases”, arguing that Article 14 provides minimum guarantees that can be amplified in the 
light of other international instruments such as the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which 
expand the scope of the protection afforded to the accused. This has, in turn, been subsequently 
confirmed by later contentious case law.29
The IACtHR established the final purpose of due process guarantees, according to which 
they “recognize and correct any real disadvantages that those brought before the bar might have, 
27 IACtHR, OC-16/99, at para 1.
28 Ibid. at paras 4.4, 4.10, 4.12.
29 Ibid. opinion points 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6, adopted by unanimity; Acosta Calderón, IACtHR Series C 129 (2005) at para 125; Bueno 
Alves, IACtHR Series C 164 (2007), at para 116; Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez, IACtHR Series C 170 (2007) at para 
164; Vélez Loor, IACtHR Series C 218 (2010) at para 157.
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thus observing the principle of equality before the law and the courts and the corollary principle 
prohibiting discrimination.”30 The Court further affirmed that the impact of the VCCR ’63 violation 
over due process rights depends on the circumstances of the case. Concerning death penalty cases, 
the IACtHR stated that: 
those States that still have the death penalty must, without exception, exercise the most rigorous 
control for observance of judicial guarantees in these cases. It is obvious that the obligation to 
observe the right to information becomes all the more imperative here, given the exceptionally 
grave and irreparable nature of the penalty that one sentenced to death could receive (IACtHR, 
OC-16/99, at para 135).31 
The Court concluded that
nonobservance of a detained foreign national’s right to information, recognized in Article 36(1)
(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, is prejudicial to the guarantees of the due 
process of law; in such circumstances, imposition of the death penalty is a violation of the right 
not to be “arbitrarily” deprived of one’s life, in the terms of the relevant provisions of the human 
rights treaties (eg the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 4; the ICCPR, Article 6) 
with the juridical consequences inherent in a violation of this nature, i.e., those pertaining to the 
international responsibility of the State and the duty to make reparations (IACtHR, OC-16/99, at 
para 137). 
The IACHR’s conclusions were assumed by unanimity, except on the matter of 
consequences, which the presiding judge Jackman rejected.
The impact of this opinion must not be underestimated. In 2000, the UN General Assembly 
“[t]aking note of the decisions of the relevant international juridical bodies . . .  particularly advisory 
opinion OC-16/99, issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights . . . , regarding the right to 
information about consular assistance within the framework of due process guarantees”, adopted 
a resolution requesting “all Member States, in conformity with their respective constitutional 
systems, effectively to promote and protect the human rights of all migrants” by means of all 
available human rights instruments.32 Its impact on the most recent HRC general comments has 
already been advanced, and it has also been cited by the ECtHR in the case Öcalan v. Turkey.33
The ICJ, on the other hand, has analysed the domestic implementation of consular rights 
of foreign nationals since 1998 (eg. Breard case, Paraguay v. United States of America) (International 
Court of Justice [ICJ], 1998). The Court has defined its rationale in its June 2001 judgment on the 
30 IACtHR, OC-16/99, at para 119 and later in Vélez Loor, IACtHR Series C 218 (2010) at para 152; and Nadege Dorzema 
and Others, IACtHR Series C 251 (2012) at para 165.
31 In later case law, the Court affirmed the same principles even outside capital cases, see Tibi, IACtHR Series C 114 (2004) 
at paras 195–196; Acosta Calderón, IACtHR Series C 129 (2005) at para 125.
32 Res 54/166, 24 February 2000, A/RES/54/166. Reference to the IACtHR OC-16/99 is again included in resolution Res 
55/92, 26 February 2001, A/RES/55/92. 
33 Application No 46221/99, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 12 May 2005 (Grand Chamber), at paras 60, 166 (European Court 
of Human Rights, 2005).
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LaGrand case (Germany v. United States of America) (ICJ, 1999) and, in a more detailed manner, in 
2004 in the Avena case (Mexico v. United States of America). This approach has been reconfirmed 
and expanded in the 2019 Jadhav case decision (India v. Pakistan).
The ICJ has addressed the consular rights issue from a different perspective, recognising, 
however, the individual character of the rights concerned.34 The Court described Article 36 as “an 
interrelated regime” of individual and State rights,35 affirming that it needed not to enter into a 
discussion of the “character of the right under Article 36 as a human right”,36 as individual rights 
were to be preserved through diplomatic protection.
While the ICJ’s perspective has not dwelled on the nature of rights as human rights when 
elaborating on the VCCR ’63 violation, it has gone further than the IACtHR as regards the practical 
consequences of the violation. The applicants in the different cases (Paraguay, Germany, Mexico 
and India) asked for the restitutio in integrum. Under this concept, they claimed that the domestic 
procedures connected to the violation of the VCCR should be nullified and, consequently, also should 
the death sentences that had been imposed without respect for individual consular rights. The ICJ 
has not endorsed that petition (nullity). Yet, dissatisfied with a mere statement of due reparation 
for the breach of Article 36.2 VCCR ’63, which expressly demands domestic law to enable full effect 
of the rights accorded, it ruled that the responsible State should grant a “review and reconsideration 
of the sentences” by any means of its choosing.37 Nevertheless, the ICJ considered that the clemency 
process, as currently practised, did not meet the appropriate requirements, stressing in Jadhav the 
need for effectiveness in the review and the reconsideration means.38 
Viewed from a human rights perspective, the reparation granted identifies itself as a 
procedural guarantee, i.e. by means of a judicial review, for the rights of both the individual and 
the sending State. However, the ICJ insisted that it was not considering a question of due process 
guarantees but rather one of violation of the VCCR.39 The Court also analysed the “gravity of the 
consequences” in LaGrand and Avena cases, stating that the need for a “review and reconsideration” 
process was required specifically when “foreign nationals have not been advised without delay of 
their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention and have been subjected to 
prolonged detention or sentenced to severe penalties.”40 In this sense, the ICJ contributed to the 
idea that the weight to be accorded to the violation of consular rights and the measures of redress 
34 LaGrand, at para 77, confirmed again in Jadhav, at para 116. Scholars who had previously written on this matter did not reach 
the same conclusions on the individual rights character of Article 36.1 (b) VCCR ’63. See Maresca (1974, pp. 227-228).
35 Ibid. 492 at para 74; Avena, 43 at para 61.
36 LaGrand, at para 78.
37 Ibid. 513 at para 125, and 571, at para 128 (7); Jadhav, 37 at para 139.
38 Avena, 60 at para 122; Jadhav, 38 at para 143, although a different perspective is provided by Judge Cançado Trindade in 
his Separate Opinion, paras 85–93, who would have preferred to ‘bar the execution of the death penalty against Mr. K. S. 
Jadhav, and call for redress for the violation of Article 36(1) of the VCCR’ (at para 93).
39 Ibid. at para 139; Jadhav, at para 137.
40 LaGrand, at para 123; Avena, at para 140.
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depended on its gravity, either in terms of the length of the detention or the penalty itself. Later, 
in Jadhav, the ICJ went a step further, expressly connecting the consequences of the violation of 
Article 36 VCCR ’63 with fair trial, although using the concept of “principles” rather than “right” 
concerning fair trial:
The Court points out that respect for the principles of a fair trial is of cardinal importance in 
any review and reconsideration, and that, in the circumstance of the present case, it is essential 
for the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr. Jadhav to be effective. 
The Court considers that the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36, Paragraph 1, of the 
Vienna Convention, and its implications for the principles of fair trial, should be fully examined 
and properly addressed during the review and reconsideration process. In particular, any potential 
prejudice and the implications for the evidence and the right of defence of the accused should receive 
close scrutiny during the review and reconsideration (ICJ, Jadhav, at para 145).
Consequently, and although the ICJ had rejected to go into the specifics of Article 14 
ICCPR violations,41 it took notice of the Covenant for the interpretation of what the possible 
remedy should be.42 This statement clearly highlights the role of individual rights violations, beyond 
the inter-State content of the relationship and the reparation to be granted. The human rights 
connection was underlined both by Judges Cançado Trindade and Robinson in their individual 
declarations. 
Furthermore, when it came to the analysis of other consequences under the responsibility 
scheme in Avena case, particularly in terms of guarantees of non-repetition, the Court considered 
that 
[t]he provision of such information [rights under Article 36.1 (b) of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations] could parallel the reading of those rights of which any person taken into 
custody in connection with a criminal offence must be informed prior to interrogation by virtue of 
what in the United States is known as the Miranda rule.43
By doing so, albeit eluding a “fundamental rights” designation, the Court placed the right 
granted by Article 36 VCCR ’63 on the same level as the guarantees against arbitrary detention or 
procedural rights at the detention moment.
In sum, the addition of the IACtHR’s consultative opinion and the ICJ’s decisions places 
Article 36 VCCR ’63 at a crossroads between the right to liberty and security (on the same level as 
Miranda rights) and the right to a fair trial (when invoking or rejecting Article 14 ICCPR). The IACtHR 
also acknowledged the intertwining nature of human rights violations in those cases when the death 
penalty imposed in violation of the right to a fair trial (including VCCR ’63 rights as a due process 
41 Jadhav, paras 36–37.
42 Ibid. para 135.
43 Avena case, at para 64.
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guarantee) becomes an arbitrary deprivation of life in accordance with human rights conventions. 
This radiant character is also seen, in a way, in ECtHR case law, which we will describe below.
1.2 Sprouting and branching rights together: the European Court of Human Rights era
In the last decade, the ECtHR has initiated—sometimes unsolicited—an interesting 
approach to Article 36 VCCR ’63 violations. Before the VCCR’63 Convention was directly invoked, 
the consular assistance rights were considered a death penalty guarantee in Ökalan v. Turkey, by 
way of reference to the IAcHR OC-16/99, both in Chamber and Grand Chamber judgments on the 
case.44
One of the first cases where this Article was invoked is M and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria. 
The applicants claimed for Bulgaria’s concurrent responsibility—the bulk of the allegations, 
however, were addressed to establish Italy’s responsibility, for this was the State where the violations 
occurred—given that no consular authority was present during the interrogation in police detention 
facilities.45 In 2012, the Court (in a Grand Chamber decision) rejected the allegations and considered 
that the case was exclusively conducted against Italy. In fact, a misunderstanding on the part of 
the ECtHR can be observed, as it concluded that “the Convention organs have repeatedly stated 
that the Convention does not contain a right which requires a High Contracting Party to exercise 
diplomatic protection, or espouse an applicant’s complaints under international law or otherwise 
to intervene with the authorities of another State on his or her behalf ”, citing its previous case law 
on the matter.46 The claimant’s allegations did not concern diplomatic protection as an expression 
of a request for international responsibility nor the eventual existence of an obligation to assist but 
rather the consular communication rights of the foreign national under Article 36.1 (b) VCCR ’63.
Also in 2012, in El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,47 the Court was 
faced with the problem of extraordinary renditions in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks 
and the so-called fight against terrorism. Some European States participated in the CIA program to 
transfer persons suspected of terrorism to the jurisdiction of the United States of America, either 
tolerating or contributing to irregular detentions or permitting the unrestricted use of European 
States’ airspace. The affair, first allocated to the Fifth Section (2010) and then to the First Section 
44 Application No. 46221/99, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 12 March 2003, at 20; and 12 May 2005 (Grand Chamber), at 166.
45 Application No 40020/03, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 31 July 2012 (Grand Chamber), at 119 (European Court of Human 
Rights, 2012a). 
46 Ibid. at para 127.
47 Application No 39630/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 13 December 2012 (Grand Chamber) (European Court of Human 
Rights, 2012b). There is a growing bibliography on the case, yet it is not specific to consular assistance rights. See Cerna 
(2013).
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(2011), was later referred to the Great Chamber (2012), with the decision cited and confirmed in 
2016 in Nasr and Ghali v. Italy.48 In this case, a German national 
had been subjected to a secret rendition operation, namely that agents of the respondent State [the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] had arrested him, held him incommunicado, questioned 
and ill-treated him, and handed him over at Skopje Airport to agents of the United States Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) who had transferred him, on a special CIA-operated flight, to a CIA-run 
secret detention facility in Afghanistan, where he had been ill-treated for over four months. The 
alleged ordeal lasted between 31 December 2003 and 29 May 2004, when the applicant returned to 
Germany (ECtHR, El-Masri, at para 3).
In its decision, the Court stated that the detention had been irregular for a number of 
circumstances: “There was no court order for the applicant’s detention”; “His confinement in the 
hotel was not authorised by a court. Furthermore, the applicant’s detention in the respondent 
State has not been substantiated by any custody records”; “During his detention in the respondent 
State, the applicant did not have access to a lawyer, nor was he allowed to contact his family or a 
representative of the German embassy in the respondent State, as required by Article 36 § 1 (b) of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations”; and “he was deprived of any possibility of being 
brought before a court to test the lawfulness of his detention.” 
His unacknowledged and incommunicado detention means that he was left completely at the 
mercy of those holding him. . . . Lastly, the Court finds it wholly unacceptable that in a State 
subject to the rule of law a person could be deprived of his or her liberty in an extraordinary place 
of detention outside any judicial framework, as was the hotel in the present case. It considers that 
his detention in such a highly unusual location adds to the arbitrariness of the deprivation of liberty 
(ECtHR, El-Masri, at para 236).
Substantially in the El-Masri case, the VCCR ’63 rights were merely one out of several 
guarantees integrated in a violation of Article 5 of the ECHR (right to liberty and security). That 
said, the VCCR violation—by itself and on its own—may have not trespassed the gravity threshold 
to be considered as an Article 5 violation, but concurrently with other failing guarantees, it allowed 
the Court to assert that violation. Further on, the Article 5 violation in El-Masri case compromised 
the right of the applicant to private and family life. For the Court, “an essential object of Article 8 
is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities”; therefore, “[h]
aving regard to its conclusions concerning the respondent State’s responsibility under Articles 3 and 
5 of the Convention, the Court considers that the State’s actions and omissions likewise engaged its 
responsibility under Article 8 of the Convention.”49
48 Application No 44883/09 Merits and Just Satisfaction, 23 February 2016, citing the El-Masri case more than thirty times 
(European Court of Human Rights, 2016). However, later case law on this topic does not take into account the VCCR ’63 
norms as legal framework to analyse the ECHR violation: Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania Application No 46454/11, Merits and 
Just Satisfaction, 31 May 2018; Al Nashiri v. Romania Application No 33234/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 31 May 2018.
49 Ibid. at paras 248–249; later confirmed in Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, at paras 308–310.
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In 2017, in Lebois v. Bulgaria,50 the ECtHR dealt with Article 36 VCCR ’63 unsolicitedly. 
A French national submitted an application alleging Article 3 (prohibition of torture) and Article 
8 (right to private and family life) violations while in detention in Sofia, Bulgaria, in 2014. These 
alleged violations concerned his detention in three different periods and facilities (police detention, 
pretrial detention and post-conviction prison). In its 2017 decision, the ECtHR rejected the Article 
3 ECHR allegations. Although the Court acknowledged a violation of Article 8 for the final part 
of the pretrial detention and post-conviction period, it was barred from deciding on the previous 
police detention and initial days of the pretrial period due to an out-of-time submission of the claim. 
Nevertheless, the Court considered that, during those early days, the facts of the case raised more 
than a “potentially serious issue under Article 8 of the Convention”, taking into account that: 
[a]s evidenced by that provision, as well as the other relevant provisions of Bulgarian law, European 
Union law and international law…that obligation [access to his family] takes on an added 
importance when the detainee is an alien whose family may be in a different country’ and ‘can 
also amount to an important safeguard to prevent arbitrary detention (ECtHR, Lebois, at para 53).
Domestic law concerning the right to contact family and make telephone calls was enough 
to weigh up—as it did—a potential Article 8 violation. The applicant never claimed violation of his 
right to be informed of consular rights or his right to contact national consular authorities. But, in 
this case, individual consular rights (right to be informed on the consular rights themselves, right to 
inform the consular post and right to communicate with consular authorities) governed the right to 
contact his family, as the Court had already verified in El-Masri case: the applicant was not able to 
inform anyone of his deprivation of liberty for twelve days, until, with the help of a co-detainee, he 
contacted the consulate of France in Sofia on 5 February 2014, which in turn informed his parents 
of his arrest and detention.
That may be the reason why the Court included the international norms ruling consular 
contact rights in its analysis of the “Relevant domestic law and practice”. Particularly when stating 
the law, the Court pointed out Bulgaria’s accession to the VCCR ’63 in 1989, which was published 
in the State Gazette on 25 May 1999 and is, by virtue of Article 5.4 of the 1991 Constitution, part of 
Bulgarian domestic law. Along with other domestic pieces of legislation, it also resorted to Directive 
2013/48 of the European Union (EU) of 22 October 2013, which governs the right to 
(a) have a third person informed of the deprivation of liberty, (b) communicate, while deprived 
of liberty, with third persons, and (c) have the consular authorities of one’s State of nationality 
informed of the deprivation of liberty without undue delay and to communicate with those 
authorities. 
50 Application No 67482/14, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 19 October 2017 (European Court of Human Rights, 2017). On 
this case, see Petit de Gabriel (2017a).
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Bulgaria had not yet, at the date of judgment, approved the 2016 transposition-
amendment of the 2005 Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the invocation of the EU Directive 
in the judgment should have been regarded as legally irrelevant: it had not been transposed and, as a 
result, was not applicable to the case. It served, however, to stress the connection between consular 
rights and the right to family contact, since they are both ruled by this same directive.
The novelty is that Lebois case was a low profile case on its own: a minor crime (breaking 
into cars with a view to stealing items from them), a “short” period of twelve days without consular 
and/or family contact, a minor prison sentence (three months’ imprisonment) due to a guilty pledge 
and an agreement with the prosecutor, as well as a short detention—having served most of the 
sentenced time in pretrial detention, the applicant spent only six days in prison. 
There are other cases where the ECtHR has referred to individual consular rights in 
connection to ECHR violations but without a specific reference to Article 36.1 (b) VCCR ’63. 
In 2014, in Kim v. Russia, the Court qualified the inexistence of consular assistance in the case 
of a stateless person as creating a “particularly vulnerable situation”. Taking into account the 
circumstances surrounding the applicant’s detention—with a view to expulsion—said vulnerability 
was considered to be contrary to Article 5.1 ECHR.51 On 26 October 2017, the ECtHR decided upon 
a case of torture involving police mistreatment of detainees during the G8 summit held in Genoa in 
2001. In that judgment, the Court reinforced the qualification of Article 3 ECHR violations, since 
other rights were also violated, including the right to consular assistance for foreign nationals. More 
specifically, the Court stated that 
Outres les épisodes de violence susmentionnés, la Cour ne saurait ignorer les autres atteintes aux 
droits des requérants s’étant produites à la caserne de Bolzaneto. Aucun requérant n’a pu prendre 
contact avec un proche, un avocat de son choix ou, le cas échéant, un représentant consulaire.52
In 2020, the ECHR has found a sound justification for a forced transfer of a consular 
agent who, due to consecutive pregnancies, made difficult for the State to assure proper consular 
assistance to nationals abroad. This case Napotnik v. Romania, although not directly related to our 
subject matter, showcases the relevance accorded to consular assistance as a public interest and a 
mean for the protection of the rights of others, balanced against the right to non-discrimination on 
situations such as gestation periods,53 which should not go unnoticed.
In summary, Article 36 VCCR ’63 has already been connected to at least the following 
human rights in the aforementioned case law: 
51 Application No 44260/13, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 17 July 2014 (ECtHR), at paras 54–56.
52 Azzolina and Others v. Italy, Application Nos 28923/09 and 67599/10, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 26 October 2017, at 
para 135, official translation not yet available (European Court of Human Rights, 2018).
53 Application No. 33139/13, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 20 October 2020, at 80-86.
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a) the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life54 as a result of a violation of fair 
trial guarantees, in IACtHR OC-16/99 and by reference to this, in Öcalan v. Turkey, 
by the ECtHR;
b) the prohibition of torture,55 in Azzolina and Others v, Italy, 2017;
c) the right to liberty and security,56 in El-Masri, 2012, and Kim v. Russia, 2014, by the 
ECtHR;
d) the right to a fair trial,57 in IACtHR OC-16/99, 1999; Breard, 1998; LaGrand, 2001; 
and Avena, 2004, as alleged by the applicants, although unacknowledged by the ICJ. 
Currently alleged by India in Jadhav;
e) the right to respect for private and family life,58 in El-Masri, by the ECtHR, and in 
Lebois, by way of construction on the ECtHR statement of the law in the case.
This trend is being taken forward at the universal level, since Article 36 VCCR ’63 rights 
have been incorporated into the Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment 35 on Liberty 
and Security of Persons59 details the common safeguards for the prevention of torture and the 
protection against arbitrary detention, qualifying the denial of consular assistance as a contributing 
factor for its violation. It has also been included in GC 36 on the Right to Life.60 Concerning the draft 
of this GC, only the United States had opposed the correlation between death penalty guarantees 
and Article 36 VCCR ’63 rights.61 A softer critique was presented by Japan, who finally proposed 
a draft conceding a margin of appreciation on the impact of the violation of consular rights in the 
due guarantees in capital cases.62 Beyond this cumulative case law, normative developments in the 
European Union have elevated consular assistance rights to fundamental rights status, as it is now 
addressed.
54 Article 1 ECHR, Article 2 CFREU (absolute prohibition of death penalty), Article 4 American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR), and Article 6 ICCPR.
55 Article 3 ECHR, Article 4 CFREU, Article 5 ACHR, and Article 7 ICCPR.
56 Article 5 ECHR, Article 6 CFREU, Article 7 ACHR, and Article 9 ICCPR.
57 Article 6 ECHR, Article 47 CFREU, Article 8 ACHR, and Article 14 ICCPR.
58 Article 8 ECHR, Article 7 CFREU, Article 11 ACHR, and Article 17 ICCPR.
59 GC No 35, at para 58. None of the comments presented by States were in opposition to this connection.
60 GC No 36, at para 42 referring explicitly to Article 36 VCCR ’63.
61 Observations of the United States of America on the Human Rights Committee’s Draft General Comment No. 36 on 
Article 6 - Right to Life at para 44: ‘We cannot agree with the Committee’s view’, ‘consular notification is not expressly 
required under Article 14 or any other Covenant provision…. Nor is consular notification a necessary component of the 
right to a fair trial or the right to due process in criminal proceedings.’ The US Congress also submitted some comments, 
but it did not mention this point of law.
62 Japan’s Comments on the Draft General Comment No 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights at para 46.
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2 Ripening days: towards a European, quasi-constitutional approach
The European Union has addressed consular assistance, impacting the life of individuals 
under EU Member States (EUMS) jurisdiction both inland and abroad, with a twofold approach, 
either as citizenship rights or as common procedural guarantees that develop the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ). By incorporating the CFREU, the Lisbon Treaty has consolidated both 
normative trends and, as a result, the link between individual consular rights and fundamental rights.
2.1 Unexpected fruits of deepening integration: citizenship rights or the ‘extended’ 
protection of nationals abroad
The transformation of the European Communities into a European Union in 1992 was 
partly conceived in terms of democratising the initial project created in the 1950s (Pausch, 2014). As 
a piece of this process, the Treaty of Maastricht created the status of European Union citizenship,63 
including a form of “extended” consular assistance64 whereby European citizens can be assisted by 
consul officials from any member State in case no consular agency of their own country of origin 
exists in the country of destination. Today, this is ruled by virtue of Article 20.2 (c) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), representing one of those citizenship rights. The 
current Article 35 of the Treaty on European Union recalls the duty of “diplomatic and consular 
missions of the Member States . . . in third countries” to “contribute to the implementation of the 
right of citizens of the Union to protection in the territory of third countries as referred to in Article 
20(2)(c)” TFEU.
The idea of granting “extended” consular assistance—i.e. consular assistance given by a 
third State—is not a new one, and it is foreseen in Article 8 VCCR ’63. Precedents can be traced to as 
early as 1911, with the Treaty of Caracas, signed between Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela;65 
modern European practice, however, is much more comprehensive in scope.66 Just like the rights 
encompassed in Article 36 VCCR ’63, the EU’s ‘extended’ consular assistance right was originally 
just a ‘conventional’ right, an individual right granted by an international treaty (TEU/TFEU) to 
a European Union Member State national. Nevertheless, since the adoption of the CFREU in 2001 
and, more specifically, its granting of “the same legal value” as the “constituent” treaties by virtue 
of Article 6.1 TEU as of 2007 (in force 2009), it has reached a fundamental right status of its own, 
63 Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C 191/1, Article 8C; currently, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C 202/1, Article 9.
64 Otherwise called ‘protection by affinity’, see Crespo Navarro (2017, p. 119).
65 The Legal Position and Functions of Consuls, at 381–3, http://doi.org/10.2307/2213739.
66 See CARE Project Report, Consular and Diplomatic Protection Legal Framework in the EU Member States, December 2010, 
although it is non-exhaustive and has not been updated since then.
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in accordance with Article 46 CFREU. Still, the real impact of this measure is difficult to assess, for 
the difficulties of its implementation have not been satisfactorily overcome yet.
The original 1992 provision was first developed on 19 December 1995 in Decision 95/553/
EC,67 in force since 2002. It detailed the content of “extended” consular assistance, expressly including 
in Article 5.1 (c) the assistance “in cases of arrest or detention”. This decision called for a follow-up 
plan within five years. The Council of the European Union created a working group on consular 
cooperation (known as COCON, or Working Party on Consular Affairs). In 2006, this group laid 
down the Guidelines on Consular Protection of EU Citizens in Third Countries.68 Simultaneously, 
the European Commission prepared a Green Paper on ‘Diplomatic and consular protection of 
Union citizens in third countries’69 where attention was drawn to the need of consent from third 
countries for this consular assistance to be granted, although according to Article 8 VCCR ’63, tacit 
consent would suffice. After the Green Paper, an Action Plan 2007–2010 was proposed. This plan 
suggested easing the access to this right through the creation of an e-portal on consular assistance 
and protection, which is already in operation. The European Commission recommended obtaining 
the express consent of the receiving State70 by negotiating bilateral agreements with third countries; 
the Commission itself should negotiate a clause for mixed agreements. It also proposed the need to 
analyse whether such a protection could be provided by the Commission’s delegations (currently 
the European External Action Service) in case the assistance required were specifically part of the 
European Union competences. 
According to the CARE Project Report (CARE Report), there is no regular practice 
concerning the renegotiation of bilateral agreements for such a clause by EUMS, and notification 
is generally given on a case-by-case basis.71 On the other hand, the option of introducing a clause in 
mixed agreements has already been implemented at least twice, i.e. in the cases of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and Afghanistan.72 
The Lisbon Treaty signified a change in the wording of citizenship rights, evincing that 
consular protection was a direct-effect disposition that concerned an individual right whose denial 
67 Decision 95/553/EC of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council 
regarding the protection for citizens of the European Union by diplomatic and consular representations [1995] OJ L314.
68 Council of the European Union, 2 June 2006, Doc 10109/06. 
69 European Commission, Green Paper on Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries, 28 
November 2006, COM (2006) 712.
70 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Effective consular protection in third countries: the contribution of the 
European Union. Action Plan 2007–09, 5 December 2007, COM/2007/767.
71 CARE Project Report, at 22. The report describes those cases (Italy and Portugal) in which bilateral treaties include a clause 
on ‘extended’ consular assistance for EU citizens, noting the current scarce practice of prior notification at a national level.
72 Council Decision 2016/123/EU on behalf of the European Union, on the signing and provisional application of the 
Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States and the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, [2016] OJ L29/1, Article 239. Council Decision 2017/434/EU on behalf of the Union, on the signing and 
provisional application of the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development between the European Union and 
its Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, [2017] OJ L67/1, Article 29.
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could generate State responsibility for damages and be judged by the European Court of Justice, as 
the European Commission clearly informed the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic 
and Social Council and the Committee of the Regions.73 Such a conclusion did not exist before 
the signing of the Lisbon Treaty.74 Besides, after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, new legal 
acts—and the possibility of control by the Court of Justice—became available, so the Commission 
recommended the adoption of new cooperation rules by means of a directive and in accordance with 
a special legislative procedure. A proposal was submitted in 2011 and passed with amendments in 
the European Parliament before the end of 2012. The Council took its time and passed it on 20 April 
2015 as Directive (EU) 2015/637.75 Transposition period ended on 1 May 2018.76
The specific rules on consular assistance to detainees in the Directive (in case of detention 
or prison, according to Article 9 (a) Directive (EU) 2015/637) are rare, just as in the previous 1995 
decision. Nevertheless, direct effect would be easily deduced by courts in the event of late or 
non-transposition by any Member State. The most significant provision in this Directive is the 
possibility for Member States to conclude intra-EU bilateral agreements for this type of assistance, 
which would preclude the individual right of choosing the assistance of any other Member State 
once the agreements are made public (Article 7 Directive (EU) 2015/637).
In other words, by being included as part of citizenship rights in EU treaties and the CFREU, 
consular assistance in case of detention abroad is granted a double status, both as a citizenship right 
and as a fundamental right. It is currently considered a direct-effect Article in the treaties; further, 
the directive specifically ruling on the matter must also be seen as including direct-effect rules, 
even if transposition is inadequately made or not made at all. As a CFREU rule, a pleading before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) should be linked with the implementation 
of European law. However, Article 20.2 (c) TFEU can be claimed in that context, given that EU 
treaties are a primary source for EU law.77 No case law on this Article—or any related secondary 
legislation—is yet available. However, the problems that may arise are significant, considering 
that ‘extended’ consular rights are based on the non-discrimination and application of the national 
standard of the State granting assistance to a non-national European citizen. National legislations 
73 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Consular protection for EU 
citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward, 23 March 2011, COM/2011/149. In this vein, a similar provision 
is included in the draft agreement with Malaysia, still under consideration: Joint Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on 
the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Framework Agreement on Partnership 
and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Government of Malaysia, 
of the other part, JOIN/2018/20 final, 3 July 2018.
74 CARE Project Report, at 29–30 and the literature cited therein on the direct-effect disposition. 
75 Council Directive 2015/637/EU on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for 
unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and repealing Decision 95/553/EC, [2015] OJ L106/1.
76 Spain, Greece and Austria adopted domestic transposition rules later than established: in June 2018, October 2018, and 
May 2019, respectively. 
77 The CJEU has already been confronted with this question in relation to Article 14 (3) TEU and Article 39.2 CFREU 
concerning the right of Union citizens to vote in elections to the European Parliament. See C-650/13 Delvigne 6 October 
2015 (Grand Chamber) at para 648 (Court of Justice of the European Union [CJEU], 2015).
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have different conceptions regarding consular assistance to detainees, from a right guaranteed by 
means of a judicial review due to the refusal to provide assistance, to a mere matter of policy of 
discretionary character.78 This recalls the need for a debate on the obligation of the State to grant 
consular assistance in case of arrest or detention and the consequences of failing to provide it.
A more wilful approach has been adopted to ensure consular assistance within the 
territorial jurisdiction of EUMS. Part of the normative program to achieve an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) included individual consular rights in the framework of common 
procedural guarantees in case of detention and conviction. ICJ case law (particularly Germany’s 
involvement in LaGrand case) has not been exempt from this new approach.
2.2 Voluntary cross-fertilisation in the area of freedom, security and justice: common 
procedural guarantees for all
The EU has underscored the procedural safeguards and the fairness of proceedings as a 
keystone of the process to build an AFSJ, which is based on creating mutual confidence among 
the judiciaries of each Member State. From the very first document on the creation of an AFSJ in 
2003, the European Commission identified the common procedural guarantees topic as the human 
rights aspect of criminal proceedings. That same year, a Green Paper on Procedural Safeguards for 
Suspects and Defendants in Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union was published, 
clearly stating that no new rights were to be created.79 To identify the rights concerned, the concept 
of “fair trial rights” should be given priority, thereby comprising the rights to legal assistance and 
representation; competent, qualified (or certified) interpreter and/or translator; proper protection 
for especially vulnerable categories and consular assistance. The Green Paper took into account 
different expressions of the right to a fair trial, as ruled by Article 6 of the ECHR, Article 14 ICCPR, 
Article 52 of the Rome Statute, Article 18 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) Statute, Article 20 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
Statute and Article 47 of the CFREU.
As regards the right to consular assistance (when the arrestee is not a national of the 
prosecuting State), the 2003 Green Paper included an express mention to Article 36 VCCR ’63 and 
the eventual causes of action in the International Court of Justice in case of non-compliance. It 
stated, however, that:
[t]his does not represent a remedy for the actual individual who has been the victim of the breach. 
Even if his home State is prepared to bring an action against the offending State, it will not provide 
an effective and practical remedy for the individual concerned. It is therefore worth considering what 
remedies should or could be available to an individual in this situation (COM/2003/75, pp. 36-37). 
78 CARE Project Report, at 668–672.
79 European Commission, 19 February 2003, COM/2003/75 (Commission of the European Communities, 2003).
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It is undeniable that the LaGrand case, where Germany was the applicant, had an impact 
on the paper. The Commission proposed to rule on those “basic rights”—including consular rights—
by developing a European common Letter of Rights which should be provided to individuals upon 
detention, in line with what the ICJ advanced in 2001 in LaGrand case for the possible inclusion of 
consular rights in the American “Miranda rights”, later affirmed in Avena case (2004).
After a public audience in June 2003, the Commission proposed a Framework Decision 
on certain procedural rights for criminal proceedings, based on Article 31 TEU (then referring to 
criminal judicial cooperation).80 In June 2007, following several unproductive years of discussions in 
the Council of the EU, the door was opened to an enhanced cooperation on the matter. Eventually, 
a new approach was taken81 whereby the different rights and guarantees would be addressed in 
separate norms.82 With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, new competences and 
an access to general legal acts—such as directives and regulations—were promptly available for the 
development of the AFSJ. This led the Council to adopt a Plan for Action in which consular rights 
were again included.83 The Plan for Action was followed by a set of directives for the different 
common procedural guarantees, with two of these Directives addressing individual consular rights.84 
Although the EU is neither a State nor a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
which certainly does not consider participation of international organisations, these directives must 
be seen as equivalent to “the laws and regulations of the receiving State”, as they rule the exercise 
of a detainee’s individual rights in the European Union Member States, although domestic norms of 
compliance are requested (the so-called national transposition).85
80 European Commission, 28 April 2004, COM/2004/328.
81 Several options were discussed, as can be seen in ‘Commission staff working document. Accompanying the Proposal for 
a Council Framework Decision on the right to interpretation and to translation in criminal proceedings. Summary of the 
impact assessment’, 8 July 2009, SEC/2009/0916 (Commission of the European Communities, 2004).
82 A first Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the right to interpretation and to translation in criminal proceedings, 
8 July 2009, COM/2009/0338, was soon abandoned because of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. See 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Consequences of the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon for ongoing interinstitutional decision-making procedures, 2 December 2009, COM/2009/0665.
83 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused 
persons in criminal proceedings [2009] OJ C295/1.
84 Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in 
criminal proceedings, [2012] OJ L142/1; Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and 
on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with 
consular authorities while deprived of liberty, [2013] OJ L294/1. The rest of the set of directives is composed of Directive 
2010/64/EU, on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L 280/1; Directive (EU) 
2016/343, on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the 
trial in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L 65/1; Directive (EU) 2016/800, on procedural safeguards for children who are 
suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L 132/1; Directive (EU) 2016/1919, on legal aid for suspects 
and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings [2016] OJ 
L 297/1.
85 See Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations at para 2.
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First, Directive 2012/13 includes—among other rights described in Articles 3 and 4—the 
right to be informed of the right to communicate with the consul by means of a written “Letter 
of Rights”, which should be “promptly” provided to those arrested or detained in a language that 
they understand. According to Point 19 of the Preamble, “promptly” must be interpreted as “in the 
course of the proceedings and at the latest before the first official interview of the suspect or accused 
person by the police or by another competent authority.” A model Letter of Rights is annexed to the 
Directive, which includes the following statement: “If you are a foreigner, tell the police if you want 
your consular authority or embassy to be informed of your detention. Please also tell the police if 
you want to contact an official of your consular authority or embassy.”86
Second, Directive 2013/48 governs the legal assistance and access to a third person (a 
relative, employer or other, as mentioned by the ECtHR in Lebois case). It includes the rights to 
inform consular officials and to communicate with them. Paragraph 37 of the Preamble expressly 
mentions Article 36 VCCR ’63. Article 7 of the Directive reflects the content of VCCR ’63 rules, 
making consular assistance dependent on a detainee’s will. This Article is excluded from the 
possibility of any temporary derogation, contrary to the right to legal assistance and the right to 
have a third person informed, which can be temporarily suspended under certain circumstances.87
Both Directives are conceived as the normative development of Article 47 CFREU, which 
concerns the “Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial”.88 Moreover, Member States are 
required to “ensure that suspects or accused persons or their lawyers have the right to challenge, 
in accordance with procedures in national law, the possible failure or refusal of the competent 
authorities to provide information in accordance with this Directive” (Directive 2012/13, Article 
8.2). Paragraph 1 further mandates Member States to record “when information is provided to 
suspects or accused persons in accordance with Articles 3 to 6”; therefore, a national procedure 
must be established. Directive 2013/48 adds the need to have “an effective remedy under national 
law in the event of a breach of the rights under this Directive”. Remedies are, nevertheless, the 
realm of Member States provided they are effective. In relation to consular rights, this would go 
in line with the “review and reconsideration” ruling by the ICJ on the failure of the United States 
to comply with the VCCR ’63 or the need for procedural consequences stated by the OC-16/99 in 
death penalty cases. A vast majority of EUMS transposition rules (24 out of 28) include, among an 
86 Directive 2012/13, transposition period ended on 2 June 2014. All Member States except Belgium needed and adopted 
specific measures. The United Kingdom and Ireland notified their wish to take part in the adoption and application of this 
Directive. Denmark opted out and is not bound by it.
87 Directive 2013/48, transposition period ended on 27 November 2016. All Member States affected have already adopted 
timely transposition measures. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark have opted out and are not bound by it, 
according to Protocols nos 21 and 22.
88 Directive 2012/13, Preamble, at para 14 and Directive 2013/48, at para 12.
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array of remedies, the possibility of an annulment of the Court’s judgement and retrial.89 There is 
no CJEU case law on Directives 2012/13 and 2013/48 as regards consular rights yet.90
To summarise the European Union’s contribution to the consular and human rights 
relationship, we could state that these two EU normative developments help to anchor the 
fundamental nature of consular assistance as one of the guarantees of contemporary human rights 
law. Both aspects (“extended” consular assistance as part of citizenship rights and consular rights as 
part of common procedural guarantees) are comprised in Articles 46 and 47 CFREU. Nevertheless, 
their respective purpose and scope differs: the former is to be implemented outside EUMS territory, 
and might be subject to CJEU control, which calls for the very interesting topic of extraterritorial 
application of human rights (Gondek, 2005; King, 2009; Meron, 1995), whereas the latter relates to 
the territorial obligations of EUMS and, as a result, is subject to control by the CJEU and, on specific 
cases, by the ECtHR.91
Further, these EU developments do not cover fully and completely the scope of consular 
rights included in Article 36 VCCR ’63. The two Directives on common procedural guarantees have 
a more restrained scope than the VCCR ’63. They apply “to any situation where, in the course of 
criminal proceedings, suspects or accused persons are deprived of liberty within the meaning of 
Article 5(1)(c) ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.”92 In 
fact, the ECHR procedural guarantees apply both to civil and criminal proceedings, although the 
ECtHR has already recognised obiter dictum the applicability of consular assistance rights in cases 
of detention with a view to expulsion of foreign nationals in irregular migrant situations, which 
in most States is an administrative, rather than a criminal, proceeding. The Directives also have a 
reduced scope compared to Article 47 CFREU on the right to a fair trial. This right simultaneously 
covers a broader range of situations than the ECHR,93 applying to any type of proceeding, and not 
only civil or criminal ones.94 Article 47 CFREU, then, encompasses Article 36 VCCR ’63, which applies 
to other forms of detention unrelated to criminal proceedings, such as detention of migrants prior 
to expulsion, psychiatric internment, or admission of elderly people in geriatric centres against their 
89 Remedies under Art. 12 should be domestically sought for the violation of any of the rights ruled by Directive 2013/48, 
where emphasis is put on the ‘effectiveness’ idea. Although analysing specifically the violation of the right to counsel, see 
Soo (2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2018).
90 Date of revision, 23 May 2021.
91 Legal questions may arise on the competent jurisdiction for protection of these rights, since they may concern both 
EU law application and ECHR application, as seen before. Specifically, concerning the European Union’s perspective, 
see Article 51, on the ‘Field of application’, Article 53, on the ‘Level of Protection’ of the CFREU, and C-399/11 Stefano 
Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal 26 February 2013 (Grand Chamber) at para 107, as opposed to Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm 
v. Ireland Application No 45036/98, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 30 June 2005 (Grand Chamber). For the Strasbourg 
perspective, see Kuhnert (2006); Lock (2010); De Hert and Korenica (2012).
92 Directive 2012/13, Preamble, at para 21 and, in similar terms, Directive 2013/48, Preamble, at para 12.
93 Kim v. Russia, at para 54 (European Court of Human Rights, 2014).
94 See Explanation on Article 47—Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial [2007] OJ C303/29; Faggiani (2017, p. 88).
33Joaçaba, v. 22, n. 1, p. 11-54, jan./jun. 2021
Intertwining consular and human...
will or without their consent.95 Citizenship “extended” consular assistance rights (when abroad in 
a third country), however, are not expressly restricted to criminal proceedings but rather to “arrest” 
and “detention”, fulfilling in a more comprehensive way the cases in which the VCCR applies. 
This broad understanding also represents the way in which “deprivation of liberty” is described by 
the Human Rights Committee when referring to examples of deprivation of liberty such as “police 
custody, arraigo, remand detention, imprisonment after conviction, house arrest, administrative 
detention, involuntary hospitalization, institutional custody of children and confinement restricted 
to an area of an airport, as well as being involuntarily transported.”96 
Equally important, citizenship “extended” consular rights (for instance, Article 46 
CFREU when abroad in a third country) only benefit European Member States nationals (thus 
enjoying European citizenship), whereas Directives 2012/13 and 2013/48 apply “to suspects and 
accused persons regardless of their legal status, citizenship or nationality.”97 Although it does not 
concern consular assistance rights themselves, applying only to the extended enforcement by a 
third European country, this subject-matter restriction of citizenship rights collides with the basic 
idea of fundamental rights as rights pertaining to every human being; yet, according to domestic 
constitutional practices, it discriminates between rights for nationals and foreign nationals. 
Hopefully, that is not the case for Article 47 CFREU on fair trial and its development through 
both directives concerning consular rights, given that these directives determine that “everyone” is 
entitled to such a right.
3 What harvest is to be reaped?
The relationship between the rules detailed in Article 36 VCCR ’63 and human rights law 
has already come a long way since its establishment by the UNGA in soft law documents in 1985 
and 1988. From that moment on, this connection has appeared in multiple references, increasing 
the number of correlated human rights specifically linked, thanks among other reasons to ECtHR 
jurisprudence. The European Union’s contribution to this evolution is significant and has been 
firmly established in later years through both primary and secondary legislation.
This leads to a final reflection: on the one hand, and from a formal perspective, there is a 
process of confluence among legal regimes and adjudication bodies which should be analysed based 
on the ILC report on Fragmentation of International Law and the formal tools to integrate it, such 
as the varied techniques of interpretation. On the other hand, and from a teleological perspective, 
a reconsideration of the rationale behind the established relationship between consular and human 
95 When commenting on the draft Article in 1961, the International Law Commission established that “this provision 
[Article 36.1] applies also to other forms of detention (quarantine, detention in a mental institution).” See Yearbook (1961), 
pp. 112-113.
96 GC 35, at para 5.
97 Directive 2012/13, Preamble, at para 16 and Directive 2013/48, at Article 2 on the matter of scope.
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rights law will lead to a concluding thought on the progressive “humanisation” of international law, 
asserting the original and true raison d’être of consular law.
3.1 From fragmentation to complexity
The described scenario involves at least three different normative orders and an array of 
adjudicatory or interpretative bodies, a fertile ground for the fragmentation debate.  Nevertheless, in 
terms of liability for consular rights violations, confluence rather than fragmentation has been the 
chosen path. The European Union has readily followed the direction taken by the ICJ, starting with 
the consequences of Article 36 VCCR ’63 violations. The ICJ initially opted for a two-tier system 
regarding guarantees of non-repetition for Article 36 VCCR ’63 violations: first, the Court suggested 
the inclusion of individual consular rights in the Miranda Declaration of rights. This has been 
adopted by EU Directive 2012/13 when spelling consular rights information in the Letter of Rights. 
Second, the ICJ put forth a police training program on consular rights, which is also included—and 
extended to judges, prosecutors and judicial staff in general—in Article 9 of EU Directive 2012/13. 
Finally, and as a means of redress, an effective system of review and reconsideration was requested 
by the ICJ as an obligation of result, taking into account the impact on the principles of fair trial and 
the right of defence of the accused.98 Article 8 of EU Directive 2012/13 and Article 12 of EU Directive 
2013/48 adopt the same approach and affirm the fundamental right to an effective remedy when 
the rights of a detainee, whatever their nature, are violated.99
On its part, the European Convention on Human Rights has tended to limit the ECtHR’s 
ability to prescribe the means of redress. The Court has historically established the responsibility 
of the State—leaving ample room for its choice of reparation—under the control of the Council of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe. This approach has been updated through the “pilot judgment” 
technique, developed to face the increasing number of applications on repeated human rights 
violation patterns in certain countries. By following this technique, the ECtHR determines the 
specific measures to be taken by the State in the form of reparation—including measures for 
prevention and guarantees of non-repetition—which should apply to similar cases in the future. 
This has been considered a quasi-legislative tool and a dual-nature review between legal cassation 
and constitutional redress.100 It has not been used by the ECtHR in relation to VCCR violations, 
whereas the LaGrand/Avena scheme could be seen as a prospective ICJ essay of pilot judgment 
designed to face the United States pattern of repeated violations of Article 36 VCCR ’63.
98 Jadhav, at paras 145–146.
99 Article 13 ECHR, Article 47 CFREU, Article 25 ACHR and Article 9 ICCPR.
100 There is a growing scholarly body of work on this type of judgments. See, among others, Abrisketa Uriarte (2013); Buyse 
(2009); Garlick (2007); Glas (2016); Haider (2013); Leach, Hardman, and Stephenson (2010); Leach et al. (2010).
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From this perspective, general international law and human rights adjudication bodies 
have come to address the matter in similar terms, too, as far as remedies for a violation are 
concerned. In the most recent case, Jadhav, the ICJ asserted for the very first time the interpretative 
role of Article 14 ICCPR when defining remedies for the violation, but not as part of the violation 
itself.101 The remedial approach cannot but confirm the understanding of consular assistance rights 
as something more than mere conventional rights, yet it falls short of legal reasoning on the nature 
of the violated rights themselves.
Turning our attention to the interaction among the substantive rules involved, we may 
argue that there is a non-reciprocal, non-homogeneous relationship among these three systems of 
law: general non-specialised International Law rules and concepts move more easily into European 
Law and Human Rights Law—which are paradoxically called “self-contained regimes” in ILC 
terminology102—than the other way round. EU rules regularly introduce both references to the 
VCCR ’63 and human rights law in the preambles and preparatory documents of the specific rules 
on citizenship or common procedural guarantees. ECtHR case law considers international law rules 
as part of the ratio decidendi, in opposition to ICJ jurisprudence, which rejects human rights rules 
considerations for the aforementioned cases as a base for substantive analysis, leaving the human 
rights consequential approach merely to the decision on remedies. The ICJ, in its 2019 decision 
on Jadhav, does not seem to have used the opportunity to take into account the substantive and 
evolutionary cross-references between the different international law regimes concerned.103 
A “smart integration” of human rights law with general international law and European 
law is nevertheless undergoing consideration. The term “smart human rights integration”104 has 
been previously used in the context of the proliferation of human rights standards, instruments, 
institutions and remedies. In the same vein, different interpretative pathways could be explored to 
achieve normative integration between the fields of law analysed in our study. Nevertheless, EU 
law and ECtHR case law must be addressed differently, as the former can be treated in terms of 
both regional international law and State practice, whereas the latter concerns a third adjudicatory 
activity. The legal mechanisms through which they could exert an influence on the interpretation 
of the VCCR in future cases are, therefore, at variance. The ICJ has not taken into account these 
developments for the statement of a VCCR ’63 violation until today.
101 Jadhav, paras 36 & 37, in relation to para 145.
102 For the three different ways in which the term ‘self-contained regimes’ can be employed, see ILC, Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 13 April 2006, A/CN 
4/L 682, at paras 123–137.
103 Clearly pointed out by Judge Cançado Trindade, Jadhav: Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras 97 & 98, and 
underlined by the number of references to human rights case law in the parties written memorial and oral pleadings. See 
note 18.
104 This fortunate expression has been coined by Eva Brems (2014). Nevertheless, the author has more recently nuanced this 
integration will through a careful examination of the pros of fragmentation in human rights law, such as the benefits of 
specialisation, contextualisation, experimentation and strategic choice opportunities; see Brems (2018).
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For ECtHR case law, the most direct interpretative means is at hand. It constitutes a set of 
“judicial decisions”, and the ICJ can always resort to it “as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law”, according to Article 38.1 (d) of its own Statute. ECtHR case law should not to be 
excluded as a term of reference for this. Unfortunately, the ICJ has done so in its Jadhav case decision. 
Furthermore, the ICJ has already stated that, when it is called to apply a regional instrument for 
the protection of human rights or the ICCPR, it has to “ascribe great weight to the interpretation 
adopted by the independent body that was established specifically to supervise the application of 
that treaty”, although the Court “is in no way obliged . . . to model its own interpretation” on it.105 
It may arrive the day for such a case.
As for the European Union primary and secondary legislation, several options can be 
advanced to define a contemporary human rights-related interpretation of Article 36.1 VCCR ’63 for 
future cases. The ILC—in the context of the fragmentation report—referred in 2006 to a “systemic 
integration”, based on Article 31.3 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), as 
a way to establish “meaningful relationships” to determine whether general and specialised rules 
“could be applied in a mutually supportive way or whether one rule or principle should have definite 
priority over the other.” It comprises both conventional and customary law, exclusively limited 
to the law applicable between the parties.106 In this sense, the Court has expressly founded its 
‘effective review and reconsideration’ approach on the effects of Article 36 VCCR ’63 on Article 
14 ICCPR rights,107 although not all authors concur in the establishment of this conexion (Villegas 
Delgado, 2020, p. 42-43). In the same vein, another form of contextual interpretation—foreseen in 
Article 31.3 (b) VCLT and currently under study by the ILC—takes into account “any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation.” 
The ILC also refers to the “conduct by one or more parties in the application of the 
treaty, after its conclusion”, as a supplementary means under Article 32 VCLT. Outside the scope of 
VCLT interpretative avenues, ICJ jurisprudence has referred to two other integrative frameworks 
in order to reconcile the rules of international law. First, the ICJ stated in the Namibia case that 
“an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire 
legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation’, which is considered to be a ‘principle of 
harmonization.”108 Additionally, the ICJ already has turned to the evolutionary interpretation of 
105 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) ICJ Reports 2012, 664, at paras 66 & 67. 
On the relation between ICJ and HR bodies and tribunals and the possible convergence of different case law, see Decaux 
(2011, p. 604).
106 ILC, Fragmentation, at paras 220 & 415–423. For an analysis of the related case law and the two requisites, see paras 
433–460 and paras 461–480, respectively. Concerning the question of applicability, “to whom must relevant rules be 
applicable?”, see French (2006, p. 305-307).
107 Jadhav, at para 145, and on this point, Declaration of Judge Robinson, para 2.xi.
108 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971 at 31.
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international law in the past, without a reference to other extraneous rules of international law, 
in order to explore the very evolution of the terms and circumstances in which a treaty is applied 
(Helmersen, 2013).109 
With respect to the systemic interpretation method (Article 31.3 (c) VCLT), the acceptance 
of EUMS extended consular assistance by the receiving State, based on EU mixed agreements or 
renegotiated EUMS consular agreements with that State that include extended consular assistance, 
will allow for the consideration of those bilateral treaties as ‘international law applicable between 
the parties’ in the sense given by VCLT interpretation rules. Nevertheless, according to the ILC’s 
current approach in its Conclusion 4, which calls for the practice of (all) State parties to the specific 
convention, i.e. the VCCR, these treaties should better be invoked as “subsequent practice” in the 
application of the treaty under Article 32 VCLT’s supplementary means of interpretation110 in order 
“to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31.”
A cautionary advice is yet to be provided. In Jadhav, the ICJ has been extremely restrictive 
when interpreting the 2008 bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan on consular access. 
It did not consider the bilateral convention a subsequent agreement or practice between the two 
States or, as Pakistan suggested, an agreement to modify a multilateral treaty between certain of 
the parties only (Article 41 VCLT ’69). Moreover, the ICJ avoided, on the basis of Article 73 VCCR 
’63, to restrain the scope of consular assistance in cases of arrest or detention on political or security 
grounds, as the bilateral agreement was not “supplementing or extending or amplifying” the rights 
granted by the VCCR ’63.111 It is clear that EU law on consular rights is not restrictive; rather, it 
confirms VCCR ’63 rights, underlines their human right dimension and establishes the obligation to 
grant judicial means of redress for failure to comply with those rights. In that sense, the ICJ should 
not find obstacles to expand its present interpretation of Article 36 VCCR ’63 from a normative 
perspective for future cases.
EU rules on consular assistance as procedural guarantees will be of a more restricted 
interpretative scope. They will not qualify as “international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties” when the sending and the receiving State are non-EUMS. They will only qualify when 
both States are indeed EUMS. However, they could also be applicable when the receiving State is a 
European Union member, as Article 36.2 VCCR foresees that “The rights referred to in paragraph 1 
of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.” 
109 An inter-temporal and evolutionary interpretation are not exempted from scholarly critiques, since they may suggest “a 
rather non-voluntarist approach to treaty interpretation”, see French (2006, pp. 295-300 and, particularly, p. 297). 
110 For the subsequent practice in terms of Article 31.3 (b) VCLT and Article 32 VCLT, see Conclusion 4 on the “Definition of 
subsequent agreement and subsequent practice” at paras 2 and 3, respectively. See also “Chapter IV. Subsequent agreements 
and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties” at para 13, as well as the commentaries on both paras 
1 & 2 at 31–37.
111 Jadhav, at paras 91–97.
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The law of the receiving State would comprise EU law, since it must be considered “domestic law” 
in EUMS. 
This very idea—EU law as domestic law of the receiving State—is to be extended to all 
primary EU law on consular rights, as established in the CFREU, comprising both extended consular 
assistance and consular assistance as a guarantee of a fair trial: treaty rules having a direct effect 
and being incorporated to the domestic legal order. Consequently, all EU norms should qualify 
for “practice”, as defined by the ILC’s fifth conclusion on “subsequent practice in relation to the 
interpretation of treaties.”112 
Finally, and away from the realm of VCLT interpretation methods, we could also turn 
towards the principle of evolutionary interpretation. Although the parties to the convention did not 
apparently mean to open the concept of consular assistance rights to future developments, there is 
indeed a certain evolution in EU’s approach: the intertwining of consular rights with a new version 
of procedural rights rekindles the purpose, rather than the concept, of consular assistance rights.
As regards the principle of harmonisation, Judge Robinson highlighted this method in 
Jadhav to take advantage of “the grand development of international law following the Second 
World War” and to connect Article 36 VCCR ’63 with Article 14 ICCPR, although the Court did 
not elaborate on it.113 In this regard, EU legislation comes to reinforce other relevant universal 
documents, such as the 1990 Migrant Workers’ Rights Convention or, with a more precautionary 
approach, the statements relevant to our subject matter that are included in HRC GC 35 and GC 36. 
Yet the legal nature of these last two documents has been questioned by scholars. As Buergenthal 
(2006) writes: 
While one can debate the question of the nature of this law and whether or not is law at all, the 
fact remains that the normative findings of the treaty bodies have legal significance, as evidenced by 
references to them in international and domestic judicial decisions (pp. 783-789). 
On its part, and although GC 35 and GC 36 were passed almost without critique, the 
United States expressed opposition to draft GC 36—which renewed Article 6 ICCPR interpretation—
rejecting this “contextual and systemic interpretation”. The United States also stated that the 
HRC’s “importing requirements from other human rights treaties” was “inconsistent with a 
proper interpretative analysis under VCLT Articles 31 and 32, ignores the express terms of the 
ICCPR, and fails to consider that not all ICCPR States Parties have ratified those other treaties or 
112 The term “practice” in the ILC conclusions encompasses “any conduct of a party in the application of a treaty, whether in 
the exercise of executive, legislative, judicial or other functions”. See ILC, Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice 
in relation to the interpretation of treaties. Text of the draft conclusions adopted by the Drafting Committee on second 
reading, 11 May 2018, A/CN 4/L 907, Conclusion 5. Conduct as subsequent practice at 14 and commentary at 37-8.
113 Jadhav, Declaration of Judge Robinson, para 2.xi. In the same vein, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras 
40–42.
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otherwise consented to such obligations.”114 The ILC Draft Conclusions on “Subsequent agreements 
and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties” devotes Conclusion 13 to the 
“Pronouncements of expert treaty bodies”, confining their role to the one granted by the rules of 
the treaty and stating that silence by a party “should not be presumed to constitute subsequent 
practice under Article 31, paragraph 3 (b), accepting an interpretation of a treaty as expressed in a 
pronouncement of an expert treaty body.”115 The fact remains that the ICJ, in its 2012 decision on 
the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo case, has granted a core interpretative role to these documents when the 
concerned rights are at stake. When human rights treaties are to be applied, the ICJ should carry 
out a carefully reasoned analysis if it chooses to depart from the interpretation given by the human 
right treaty body.
Furthermore, these normative efforts could be seen as expressing an opinio juris, albeit in 
statu nascendi, which triggers a new universal customary rule regarding individual consular rights 
from a human rights law perspective. The fact that EU law and ECtHR case law take the same 
direction might be seen as a catalyst, which could eventually be considered as regional customary 
“international law applicable in the relations between the parties” (Article 31.1.3 VCLT) with regard 
to the concept and the very purpose of consular assistance rights. Some scholars have underlined, 
however, that such a trend is not a methodologically ordered approach but rather a more complex 
view on judicial interpretation, which runs the risk of encroaching on “judicial creativity” (French, 
2006; Helmersen, 2013).
Allegations of violation of Article 14 ICCPR in Jadhav could have prompted this contextual, 
systemic and harmonising interpretation, although it could also have stirred up the debate on 
consensual jurisdiction limits and applicable law. As a matter of fact, systemic interpretation has 
already provoked an indirect debate among ICJ judges regarding the problems arising from the 
application of international law for which a jurisdiction has not been expressly accepted, as stated 
by Judge Buergenthal in his separate opinion of 6 November 2003, Judgment on the Oil Platforms 
case (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) (ICJ, 1992). A similar position was held 
by Judge Higgins, whereas opposite views were held by Judges Koroma and Simma.116 The ICJ 
stated it clearly in Jadhav since the very beginning: it was not a case of violation of the ICCPR, 
although when it came to remedies, the ICCPR was the key element to define “effectiveness”.
That said, our last key issue is built around ICJ case law, including the most recent 
decision on Jadhav, to analyse how an alternative interpretation to the contextual, evolutionary 
or harmonizing reading could be achieved, also taking into account European developments. To 
114 Observations of the United States of America on the Human Rights Committee’s Draft General Comment No 36 on 
Article 6 - Right to Life, 6 October 2017, at para 7. 
115 ILC, Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties, at 16 and commentaries 
at 106–16.
116 On this point, see ILC, Fragmentation, at paras 451–458. French (2006, p. 289) underlines that “if one gives too broad an 
interpretation of what he [Buergenthal] is saying, Article 31 (3) (c) becomes almost a dead-letter.”
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explore and arrive at an answer, we must now turn to the rationale for the construction of the 
connection between individual consular rights and human rights and examine to what extent it 
affects the proper understanding of the general international law regime of consular law and the 
consequential problems which then arise.
3.2 From state-centred to human-centred interpretation of law
The final and most difficult question to answer is defining why general international law 
—and the ICJ as its interpreter—should take into account self-contained regimes such as human 
rights law and/or European law when interpreting Article 36.1 VCCR ’63. To resolve this question, 
the logic for the intertwining of individual consular and human rights should be explored first, 
and, consequently, that logic should be exported into the VCCR’s own rationale. We are therefore 
turning to the most classical teleological interpretation means, as set in Article 31.1 VCLT.
In seeking the logic of the human rights approach, ICJ and ECtHR cases and the terms of 
IACHR consultative opinion established a presumption whereby the impact of individual consular 
rights violations was dependent on the gravity of the cases: irreparable prejudice (death penalty 
cases)117 or gross violations (like the ECtHR judgment in El-Masri) suggest the idea that respect for 
any guarantee and for any of the detainee’s rights was of utmost importance and that this could 
have changed the course of the proceedings in those cases. Yet, after considering Lebois v. Bulgaria, 
gravity does not seem to be the ECtHR’s main reason for establishing a link between consular 
rights and protected human rights: neither the detention period nor the penalty risk was long or 
extremely severe. In this particular case, the special situation of being a foreign national, not having 
translation services available nor specific indication on how the communication system inside the 
detention facility worked, coupled with the difficulty to get a phone card due to lack of money, 
constituted special circumstances for the Court and made the situation a risky one. A “potential 
violation” of the right to family life (in the case of a detention, the right to contact the family) was 
declared obiter dictum dependent on consular rights, despite procedural barriers preventing the 
Court to enter into the merits. 
Besides, European Union legislation on consular assistance derives from the CFREU as a 
human rights normative expression and always involves a system of judicial review for violations, 
irrespective of the gravity of the case, when a potential violation of consular assistance rights takes 
place. At the same time, the progressive recollection of ECtHR cases has drawn a landscape where 
individual consular rights apparently guarantee an array of plural human rights: the right not to 
be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life, the prohibition of torture, the right to liberty and security, the 
right to a fair trial, and the right to respect for private and family life. Ultimately, when a foreigner 
117 Stressed in Jadhav, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras 43–84 and 99–103.
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is concerned, the burden on the State to guarantee certain rights is increased. This has already been 
highlighted by the IACHR in 1999: 
The presence of real disadvantages necessitates countervailing measures that help 
to reduce or eliminate the obstacles and deficiencies that impair or diminish an 
effective defense of one’s interests. Absent those countervailing measures, widely 
recognized in various stages of the proceeding, one could hardly say that those 
who have the disadvantages enjoy a true opportunity for justice and the benefit 
of the due process of law equal to those who do not have those disadvantages 
(IACtHR, OC-16/99, at para 119).118
With respect to “due process” or other rights, consular rights guarantee that foreign 
nationals will not be subjected to unacknowledged detention, that they will understand the process 
and the rest of their rights, that they will have access to contact and be able to alert their family, that 
they will at least have access to the knowledge of the system of redress available in case of violation 
of their rights (either fundamental or not) and so on. The guarantee for respect and preservation 
of those rights lies in having the opportunity to be assisted by consular authorities from the very 
moment of detention or arrest. Consular information and communication rights must be respected 
for the sake of preservation of a broad range of human rights, a condition for equal treatment in a 
material sense. Hence, individual consular rights appear as a guarantee and a consequence of the 
non-discrimination provision present in all human rights instruments.119
We should now turn to the realm of general international law and the VCCR’s rationale 
to fit the preceding understanding. It is argued that consular assistance rights are individual rights 
granted by international norms, which confer a right to the foreign national’s State to demand 
international responsibility for their violation in the receiving State. Both dimensions of consular 
rights—State or individual rights; rights linked to general international law or human rights law—
are rooted in the basic idea that Law is a tool for regulating human relations. This primary idea is 
also present at an international level.
For some time, the State has been seen as the exclusive, privileged international law 
subject, whereas in fact it is a mediator agent between individuals across borders, and not only for 
fundamental rights concerns. This has been clearly stated in international law by different scholarly 
traditions, from those writing about individual rights under the common guarantee of “civilized 
States” (Fiore, 1890, pp. 15-16, 164-177) in the last decades of the nineteenth century, to those at the 
dawn of the twentieth century already reflecting on a Common Law for humankind (Pillet, 1894, 
118 This is also Judges Cançado Trindade and Robinson’s approach in Jadhav: Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, 
paras 38–39 and Declaration of Judge Robinson, paras 2.vi and vii.
119 Non-discrimination may be a clause which is applicable in connection with a guaranteed right (such as in Article 14 ECHR 
and Article 1 ACHR) or it may be a right directly applicable in itself (as in Article 21 CFREU and Article 26 ICCPR). 
42 Disponível em: https://portalperiodicos.unoesc.edu.br/espacojuridico
Eulalia W. Petit de Gabriel
1889120), long before Wilfred Jenks (1958) published his well-known The Common Law of Mankind. 
James Brown Scott (1930) wrote that:
[t]he thesis which the present paper maintains, and will endeavour to establish, is that the individual 
inevitably is the primary unit of an international community; that the state is only a secondary and 
intermediate unit’ and that ‘the individual is the unit of law, and that the law of international 
community is but the generalized law of the individual (p. 15). 
Along with Jenks (1958), Georges Scelle (1932), Nicolas Politis (1925) and Phillip C Jessup 
(1956) are but notable representatives of this approach, each of them with a different perspective 
but a common sensibility towards the role of the individual in international law. More recently, 
Emmanuel Roukounas e Hague Academy of International Law (2003), Theodor Meron (2006), 
Richard Falk (1993), Umberto Leanza (1997) and Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade (2005, 2011), 
among others, have also proposed their views on the matter amid a rising movement for a new 
global law or constitutionalism approach to international law (Cebada Romero, 2013; Cottier & 
Hertig Randall, 2003; Domingo, 2011; Peters, 2006; Simma, 1994; Teubner, 1997; Von Bogdandy, 
2006; Walter, 2007; Ziccardi Capaldo, 2008). This scholarly approach is today confirmed mainly, but 
not exclusively, by the humanisation process through normativity and international State control 
for the protection of human rights, as stated by Judge Robinson in his Declaration in Jadhav.121
Nevertheless, even when retaining a more traditionalist approach to international law 
as inter-state law, the rights discussed in this paper were apparently already part of the consular 
functions in 1846 with a view to protect the individual: “[L]orsque les tribunaux du pays poursuivent 
un compatriote du consul, il peut se présenter en justice, non comme protecteur, mais comme conseil de l’inculpé, 
surtout si celui-ci était exposé à perdre la vie, la liberté ou ses propriétés” (De Mensch, 1846, p. 58).122 
Further, the historical origin of consular functions and law, according to the Report of the ILC 
Special Rapporteur in 1957, was private trade, and the role of consuls was to settle disputes among 
merchants and protect nationals and their interests abroad.123 The ILC’s commentaries regarding 
draft Article 5 on consular functions, where it stated a general clause and a list of functions by 
way of example, stressed that consular functions are granted for “safeguarding the interests of the 
sending State and of its nationals”, both at the same level and with the same degree of priority. The 
commentary also underscored the relevance of temporary protective functions, “where the person 
concerned is prevented from looking after his interests by serious illness or where he is detained or 
120 For an analysis of the literature of that period, see Petit de Gabriel (2003, pp. 103-110). 
121 Jadhav, Declaration of Judge Robinson, para 2.
122 In the same vein, these assistance functions are described in Heyking (1930, pp. 811, 873, 889-909); Žourek (1962, pp. 392-
393).
123 Special Rapporteur, Report on Consular intercourse and immunities by Mr J Zourek, 15 April 1957, Doc A/CN 4/108, 
(1957) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission at 71–82.
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imprisoned”, and the extension of this protection in time for “safeguarding the interests of minors 
and persons lacking full capacity.”124
Even before 1957, prior to the confirmation of the present reading of Article 36 VCCR ’63, 
it was clearly established that consular law was a function not only for the intercourse among States 
but more specifically for a human-centred service, to protect and guarantee individuals in distress 
situations in which inequalities or vulnerabilities were at stake. It should not be hard to undertake 
an approach to the VCCR’s interpretation and to rights defined in Article 36.1 (b) by resorting to the 
very object and purpose for which these rules were granted, as mandated by Article 31 VCLT ’69. 
Currently, and taking into account that detention, custody and other related situations abroad are 
governed by international applicable standards for the protection of human rights, the ICJ should 
not be impeded to retain the connection between individual consular rights and human rights in a 
context of detention and judicial proceedings based on a multiple choice of interpretative pathways, 
starting with the most common “object and purpose” means, as consular law is—and has always 
been—a human-oriented set of rules, specifically created to serve individuals abroad. This should 
not be considered a “droit de l’hommisme” when addressing the case of individual consular rights, 
mainly because of the consular law object and purpose described above, but also because we are just 
proposing to reinforce the commitment to respect human rights through non-dedicated channels; 
namely, by resorting to traditional State diplomatic protection for individual rights violations when 
human rights mechanisms are non-existent, inapplicable or insufficient, without prejudice to the 
nature of the alleged rights nature—be them human rights or merely conventional rights—or the 
purpose and functions of the tribunal or institution concerned, as long as there is an interpretative 
means to force the pace in this intertwining process.
Conclusions
As a final reflection, the door is still open for the ultimate problem: the State’s willingness 
to comply with its international obligations when they affect individuals—either in terms of 
plain conventional rights or related to fundamental/human rights. The ICJ has stressed it again 
in Jadhav: nullity of domestic judicial decisions is not the international sanction for violation 
of the VCCR ’63. It is up to the State concerned to provide means of redress under the form of 
“effective review and reconsideration”. Fortunately, the ICJ has finally included in Jadhav 2019 
Article 14 ICCPR standards in the threshold to comply with this review and reconsideration path, 
initiated in Lagrand and Avena. Nullity would neither be the consequence in most international 
human rights enforcement regimes or in the EU regime for procedural guarantees. Effectiveness 
124 ‘Report of the Commission to the General Assembly. Document A/4843: Report of the International Law Commission 
covering the work of its thirteenth session, 1 May–7 July 1961. Draft Article on Consular Relations, with commentaries 
1961’, (1961) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Article 5 and Commentaries at 95–99.
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and national margin of appreciation to define remedies for such a violation is the option, too, in the 
EU construction of consular rights as procedural guarantees.125 Nullity and re-trial are essentially 
dependent on domestic law compliance, including compliance with international judicial decisions 
themselves, as international law mechanisms are always subsidiary and sometimes indirect ways 
(like diplomatic protection) to guarantee individual legal rights. 
When propositions for a world court of human rights have been put forth,126 probably 
causing a further fragmentation among a growing number of judicial institutions, attention 
should be given both to a) the role and challenges of international adjudication bodies when 
applying these human-oriented rules and b) the role and challenges of domestic law for granting 
full respect for international awards, either in the field of human rights or in the field of general 
international law.
As it has been proved in the case of Medellín, one of the fifty persons concerned in the 
Avena ICJ judgment, the United States had no easy way out of its infringement of the primary rules 
on consular assistance rights and its compliance with the ICJ’s decision.127 In another case deriving 
from Avena, Judge Tom Price wrote that “[l]amentably, the applicant [Mr Leal] finds himself in 
possession of an apparent right under international law without an actual remedy under domestic 
law.” According to Steve Charnovitz (2012), 
such a disconnection in the topology of rights and remedies should not exist in any country’s law, 
but especially not in a country like the United States, whose Constitution and Supremacy Clause 
make clear that ‘all treaties made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land’.128 (pp. 572-575).
125 Art. 12 Directive 2013/48 n 96 and analysis upon this rule, prospective models, the EU Member States transposition and 
a balanced critique referred to in n 101.
126 Mainly a scholarly topic, and probably not rooted into the intergovernmental arena, the first occasion this issue was 
considered was in Trechsel (2004). Sometime later, and in the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, a report was commissioned to Professor Martin Scheinin (European University Institute), 
entitled ‘Towards a World Court of Human Rights Research report within the framework of the Swiss Initiative to 
commemorate the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ and published online on the EUI 
website. Other pertinent publications have been released and some roundtables have taken place, like the one held at 
the National Taiwan University in 2012. See also Nowak (2012) and the draft Statute prepared by Nowak, Kozma and 
Scheinin in 2010 and published online, ‘A World Court of Human Rights: Consolidated Draft Statute and Commentaries’, 
at https://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/Professors/Scheinin/ConsolidatedWorldCourtStatute.pdf. 
A project webpage has been set up at http://www.worldcourtofhumanrights.net/. A so-called Treaty of Lucknow is the 
proposed Statute of the World Court of Human Rights. For arguments strongly opposing the idea, see Alston (2014).
127 See, for instance, McGuinness, (2008a). On the difficult domestic question of the presidential powers to implement the 
ICJ decision and the opposition of the Supreme Court, see McGuinness, (2008b). In relation to judgment compliance in 
the case, see Rea Falcón (2017, pp. 549-556) and Romano (2017).
128 ‘Ex parte Humberto Leal, 2011 WL 2581917 (Tex. Crim. App. June 27) (Price, J., concurring) (internal footnote omitted)’, 
as cited in Charnovitz (2012, pp. 572-575). The United States Supreme Court called for an Avena Act to be passed, but 
time went by and no such law ever came into existence, see Duffy (2010). A proposal for modification of the VCCR by 
way of bilateral conventions between the United States and third countries limiting individual consular rights has been 
advanced, but it has not been implemented yet, see Howell (2013).
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Unfortunately, time has shown that “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal 
remedy” (ubi jus ibi remedium) is not an ever-lasting truth.129 
A similar problem arises in European countries regarding compliance with ECtHR 
decisions. After a long period when judgments were considered exclusively declaratory and 
execution was only under the supervision of the Council of Ministers, the Court has now shown 
interest and has grown more concerned about this matter (Larsen, 2013; Sicilianos, 2014).130 It is 
especially difficult for States to comply in those cases where the Convention violation stems from 
judicial proceedings whose decisions were final. In some cases—for instance, the Spanish Judiciary 
Act reformation in 2015—a cause of action (“procedimiento de revision”, or review procedure) has 
been introduced based on ECtHR judgments where a final domestic judicial decision was adopted 
in violation of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR.131 Although an important step, unfortunately 
it has not resolved other potential cases. It would not be possible to ask for such a review in Spain 
when a VCCR ’63 individual rights violation is declared by an ICJ judgment in the same vein as 
in the LaGrand, Avena or Jadhav cases. Paradoxically, annulment of the judgment and re-trial 
could be claimed before domestic Spanish courts for a violation of consular rights as minimum 
procedural guarantee arising out of Directive 2012/13 and/or Directive 2013/49. Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness of international adjudication decisions in domestic legal orders is another topic that 
is worth reflecting on.
Law, be it international or domestic, is an instrument for peaceful human relations. And, 
as such, it is composed of a set of techniques—primary and secondary rules—to serve, preserve, 
guarantee, and realise individual and collective rights, whether fundamental or not. In international 
law, States act as fundamental subjects, rulers, keepers, and settlers of rights, of human beings, the 
pillars of Law. Classical and contemporary scholars have already acknowledged this. But international 
tribunals must follow current trends to reaffirm the undisputed evolution of International Law 
towards placing the individual at the heart of Law, as it already is the case with Consular, European 
and Human Rights Law.
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